Söder Targets Bürgergeld for Ukrainians

Söder demands full rollback of Bürgergeld for Ukrainians

Bürgergeld for Ukrainians has become the latest flash-point in Berlin after Bavarian premier Markus Söder declared that every refugee from Ukraine—past and future—should be switched to the lower asylum-seeker allowance. In a recorded ZDF “Sommerinterview” the CSU leader said Germany was “the only country in the world” granting its regular social-security rate to war-displaced Ukrainians and pledged to “push this through” inside the governing coalition. His stance surpasses the April deal between Christian-Democrats and Social-Democrats, which would limit the change to people arriving after 1 April 2025.

The demand lands as the labour-market integration of Ukrainians proceeds slowly; only about one third are currently in jobs. Söder argues the higher benefit removes incentives to accept entry-level work and keeps skilled newcomers idle. He insists that aligning support with the asylum scale—563 euro versus 460 euro for single adults—would both cut spending and accelerate hiring.

How Bürgergeld for Ukrainians became policy

When Russia’s full invasion sent millions fleeing westward in 2022, Berlin and the Länder agreed to place Ukrainians directly under the Bürgergeld system, then still called Hartz IV. The logic was administrative speed: unlike asylum applicants, Ukrainians receive residence rights immediately, so Jobcentres could start language courses and placement programmes without waiting for asylum decisions.

That shortcut proved expensive. Federal data show that in 2024 roughly 6.3 billion euro—out of 46.9 billion in total Bürgergeld outlays—went to Ukrainian households. The sum contributed to a nine-percent yearly rise in overall payments, amplified by inflation-indexed benefit hikes. Around 5.5 million residents, including children, drew the allowance last year; foreigners made up 47 percent.

Financial and labour-market stakes

Ministry figures released in July reveal that 22.2 billion euro of Bürgergeld went to non-German nationals, with the Ukrainian share ranking first. Söder says this cost is unsustainable when domestic budgets face deficits and infrastructure backlogs. He also points to the employment rate: despite strong qualifications, many refugees struggle with language, childcare and recognition of diplomas, leaving tax revenues unrealised.

Supporters of Bürgergeld for Ukrainians counter that the benefit is tied to active integration services—vocational guidance, subsidised training, local transport passes—that disappear under asylum-level assistance. Labour economists from the IAB warn that downgrading could push people into unregistered jobs or deepen poverty, especially among single mothers.

Coalition friction over Bürgergeld for Ukrainians

The governing agreement signed in April already plans to stop Bürgergeld for Ukrainians who arrive after the cut-off date, once eligibility checks are automated. Labour Minister Bärbel Bas promised a “low-bureaucracy switch” but has yet to publish guidelines, meaning newcomers still qualify for the higher rate. Söder now seeks to reopen the compromise and apply it retroactively to the roughly one million Ukrainians who reached Germany since February 2022.

Social-Democrat leaders oppose retroactive cuts, citing legal uncertainty and potential court challenges. Greens warn of humanitarian fallout and remind partners that many municipalities rely on Bürgergeld funds to cover rent subsidies and health insurance for refugees. Back-bench CDU MPs, by contrast, back Söder’s line, arguing that voters demand stricter control of social spending.

What happens if the proposal advances?

To implement a universal rollback, the coalition would need to amend the Social Code again and craft a transition for families already budgeting around Bürgergeld. Administrative unions caution that Jobcentres, still busy with software upgrades, cannot handle dual recalculations in one fiscal year without delays in payments to all beneficiaries.

Comparative studies show that Poland, Czechia and the Netherlands provide smaller monthly cash transfers but greater in-kind support such as free accommodation or meal vouchers. Söder cites these examples to defend his plan; critics respond that Germany’s economy ultimately benefits from faster labour absorption and that cutting income now may prolong public dependence.

The cabinet is expected to revisit the issue in September when updated cost projections for 2026 are tabled. Whether Söder secures majority backing or faces pushback from Berlin ministries, Bürgergeld for Ukrainians will dominate autumn budget talks—and influence how Germany balances solidarity with fiscal prudence.